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All the basic laws of the traditional logic can be derived from the 
characteristic function f(A/a) which is 1 or 0 according as object a 
satisfies predicate A or not. There is good reason to believe that it is 
worthwhile to extend this formalism to the case where f(A/a) can 
take any value in the continuous domain [0, 1]. The implications of 
this generalization to the concepts of logic, probability and informa- 
tion theory are studied. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of information is based on the concept of probability. 
The concept of probability is defined on a sigma algebra or a distributive 
lattice. This is justified by the fact that the usual ogic is isomorphic to a 
distributive lattice. All the laws of the Boolean logic can be derived from 
the characteristic function f(A/a) which is 1 if object a belongs to 
class A and is 0 if it does not belong to class A. A class is understood as 
the extension of a predicate. It is assumed that there exists an empiri- 
cally based, well-defined procedure by which to determine whether a 
belongs to A or not. This assumption is obviously not always satisfied. 
The basic postulate that a and A determine the value of f(A/a) 
which is either 0 or 1 is called here "the postulate of fixed truth set." 
The breakdown of this postulate was already noticed when philosophers 
made distinction between the primary quality and the secondary quality. 
* This paper was scheduled to be presented at the abortive Fifth Prague Con- 
ference on Information Theory, Statistical Decision Functions and Random 
Processes, September 9-13, 1968 and to be published in the Proceedings. A sim- 
plified version of this paper was orally presented at the IEEE Systems Science 
and Cybernetics Conference, October 14-15, 1968 at San Francisco. The work 
reported in this paper was partly supported by the research grant AF-AFOSR- 
68-1466 from the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. 
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The characteristic function of a secondary quality depends not only on 
a and A but also on a third argument, x, which is the observer. But this 
kind of trouble could be avoided easily either by requiring precise con- 
ditions about x or by considering x as an index of A, i.e., considering an 
A with different values of x as different A's. 
Another case of deviation of f(A/a) from 0 or 1 that can be easily 
avoided happens when the specification of the object a is not sufficiently 
accurate so that a usual sample of a is in reality a probabilistic mixture 
of two kinds of objects, one of them satisfyingf(A/a) = 1 and the other 
satisfying f(A/a) = 0. This case of a mixture will be discussed later in 
(41) and again in (58) below. We can show, however, that in the 
majority of cases, we cannot reduce the continuous value of f(A/a) to a 
binary ease) 
An irreducibly continuous characteristic function seems to be needed 
in the typically cybernetical situation, i.e., in the case where the ob- 
server and the object are in such a strong interaction that the act of ob- 
servation leaves an uncontrollable disturbance on the observed object. 
This is obviously the case in many psychological tests and in quantum 
mechanical measurement. A consequence of such uncontrollable disturb- 
ance is that when we make two observations in different orders the result 
will not be the same in general. Such order-dependence of observations 
will play one of the basic roles in the following derivation. See in par- 
ticular (43) and (62) below. 
The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct logic, probability and in- 
formation theory on the basis of irreducibly continuous characteristic 
functions. As stated above, if the postulate of fixed truth set is tenable, 
as it is the case with the binary-valued characteristic functions, every- 
thing with regard to predicates can be reduced to the set theory of ob- 
jects, and it is easy to derive directly therefrom logical operations uch 
as conjunction, disjunction, negation, etc. But, in our case, since the 
postulate of fixed truth set is not valid, we have to derive these logical 
operations of predicates independently of the set-theoretical operations 
applied to obiects. That is what makes our approach at once difficult 
and challenging. 2 The leading idea is that "implication" is the most basic 
1 In Ref. [2], a predicate whose characteristic function is irreducibly nonbinary 
(not necessarily 0 or 1) for an object was called an improper predicate for the objeet. 
2 This marks a fundamental difference from Zadeh's theory of fuzzy set, which 
uses from the beginning the notions of set, conjunction, disjunction, etc., as if 
they were already known to us. His determination f the values of the membership 
function for conjunction and disjunction is arbitrary. See Ref. [5]. 
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operation in logic and therefore it should be defined first and then we 
should try to reconstruct conjunction, disjunction, etc. from implica- 
tion. Not everything follows necessarily in the derivation, and certain 
heuristic groping is necessary. What is important during this heuristic 
groping is the idea that probability is more basic and more natural to 
our thinking than logic, and that we should always try to uphold the 
laws of probability as much as possible. For more about he philosophical 
background of this work, see Section 7 of this paper and Refs. [1] and 
[2]. The present paper is an improved and streamlined version of the 
author's earlier works on a similar topic [Refs. 1-4]. 
It is to be kept in mind that any meaningful generalization of an exist- 
ing valid theoretical scheme must be such that the new generalized form 
of the theory in conjunction with some additional restrictive conditions 
will result in the present form of the theory. Thus, we should aim at a 
new form of logical theory such that it becomes identical with the exist- 
ing logic with its inseparable set-theoretic notion of truth-sets if an addi- 
tional restriction is imposed. See (45) below. This is also necessary be- 
cause the metalanguage we use in formulating the new theory assumes 
the usual logic and the usual notion of truth-set, and the last two named 
must be justified as a permissible special case of the more general frame- 
work of the object language which we are going to develop. 
In the foregoing paragraphs and in the main part of the following 
sections (except Section 6), it is assumed that for each predicate and 
each object considered there exists a test procedure which, if applied, 
gives either an affirmative ("true") or negative ("false") result. 3Even 
in the usual logical framework, there are groups of propositions which 
are not "testable" in this sense. Hypotheses of general nature cannot be 
empirically demonstrated to be true or false by a finite body of experi- 
mental results. It is known that some mathematical theorems cannot be 
proven to be true or false. It is usually taken for granted that in spite of 
their direct untestability they have to be either true or false. In this 
paper, we refrain from asserting anything definite about the directly 
untestable cases in the new generalized framework. 
It is safer to assume that what follows refers only to the directly 
testable cases. In the last section (Section 6) of this paper, however, we 
shall briefly introduce an entirely different case, in which a single experi- 
ment directly gives the "probability" of an object a satisfying a predicate 
s Any proposition can be reduced to a pair of object and predicate by tran- 
scribing it in the form: "The case is such that the proposition is true." 
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A instead of an yes-no answer. This can also be formulated in terms of a 
continuously-valued characteristic function f(A/a), and leads to a 
similar type of new logic. In this case, we  do not need to talk about the 
"uncontrollable disturbance" by  observation, and we should not con- 
fuse this case with the general p rob lem dealt with in the main  body  
(Sections 1-5) of this paper. 
2. NON-DISTRIBUTIVE LOGIC 
We shall now develop more systematically the ideas explained in 
Section 1. 
(1) Let 0 = {a, b, c, .-.} and ¢R = {A, B, C, ...} be, respectively 
a set of objects and a set of predicates such that for each object a E 0 
the set 5~ is the set of all possible predicates applicable (affirmatively or 
negatively) to a, and for each predicate A E 5~ the set 0 is the set of all 
possible objects to which A is applicable (affirmatively or negatively). 
Note that the notion of truth-set is used in the metalanguage h re. 
(2) By an object is meant an object at a particular instant, and an 
object is in a particular (pure or mixed) "state" at a particular instant. 
If the state of an object at instant tl and that at t2 are different, we 
describe them as two different objects. 
(3) To each predicate A E (R corresponds a well-defined experi- 
mental test procedure by which we can determine whether the predicate 
A is affirmed (true) or negated (false) by an object. 
(4) Each pair, a E 0 and A E (R, determines a real numberf(A/a) 
in the domain [0, 1]. f(A/a) is called the characteristic function of 
Aona .  
(5) It  is assumed that we can produce any number of samples of 
the same a. The characteristic function f(A/a) is interpreted as the 
relative frequency of affirmative results obtained by the test of A on a 
collection of infinitely many samples of a. 4 The object a may be under- 
stood to mean a (random) sample of the collection of objects. 
(6) If, for all predicates A E ~ and two given objects a, b E ¢9, 
we have f(A/a) = f(A/b), then we say that a and b are equivalent and 
write a = b. If, for all objects a E 0 and two given predicates A, B E (R, 
we have f(A/a) = f(B/a), then we say that A and B are equivalent 
and write A = B. 
4 Alternatively, f(A/a) may be considered as the degree of expectation on our 
part of obtaining an affirmative result on the observation f A applied to object a. 
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(7) The set 6~ contains two members ~ and [] such that for all 
objects a E V we have f (~/a)  = 0 and f (  []/a) = 1. 
(8) By the product AB (A,  B E ~) is meant a predicate which is 
true if and only if we obtain affirmative results both in the test of A and 
in the test of B, whereby the test of A follows immediately the test of B. 
If A, BE  ~ thenAB E ~. 
(9) In performing the test of AB on a, the object a changes after 
the test of B to another object a ~ which is determined by a and the test 
result of B. If B is affirmative, we write a r = Ba. If a E 0 and B E 6~, 
then Ba E 0. If B = C, then Ba = Ca, and if a = b then Ba = Bb. From 
Definition (8), we have f (AB/a )  = f (A /Ba)  f (B /a ) .  
(10) From (9) follow for all A, B, C E ~: 
(10a) If B = C, then AB = AC and BA = CA. 
(10b) ~A = A~ = ~f 
(10c) []A = A•  = A 
[The proof of (10c) requires an additional assumption that [::]a = a, 
for all a E 0, which we adopt.] 
(11) If A E ~ and AA = A, we say that A is a simple predicate. 
The set 8 of simple predicates i a subset of ~. 8 c (~. (10b) and (10c) 
imply, ~ ,  [] E 8. 
(12) If A, B E ~ and AB ~- BA,  we say A and B are compatible 
and write A ~-~ B. The compatibility relation is by definition reflexive 
and symmetric but not necessarily transitive. (10b) and (10c) imply 
A ~ ~ andA ~ [] for aliA E (~. I rA,  B E 8 andA ~-~ B, thenAB E 8. 
(13) If A ~-~ B and AB = A for A, B E 8, then (and only then) we 
say that A implies B and write A -~ B. The implication relation is by 
definition reflexive [note AA = A for A E 8], and transitive, but not 
necessarily symmetric. [Proof of transitivity: If A --* B and B -* C, then 
AC = ABC = AB = A = BA = CBA = CA]. 
(14) If A = B, then A --~ B and B --~ A, and if A --~ B and B -~ A, 
then A = B. [Note: the equivalence (=)  was defined in (6).] 
(15) For al lA E 8, ~,2~--*A --~ [].See (10b) and (10c). 
(16) DEFINITION. For given A, B E 8, C is said to be the conjunc- 
tion of A and B and denoted C = A N B if and only if C -~ A, C --* B 
and X -~ C whenever X E 8 and X --~ A and X -~ B. 
(17) THEORE~ (EXISTENCE of CONJUNCTION). Consider the infi- 
nite product C . . . .  ABAB.  Then C E $, and C satisfies the definition 
(16) ofC  = A NB.  I fA  ~B,  thenC = AB = BA.  
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[Proof. Start with finite products of the types, AB • • • AB,  BA  • • • BA,  
AB  • • • BA,  BA  • ..  AB ,  and pass to the limit where all four become C. 
(See Ref. [I] for the details). 
(18) 7A is defined by the same test as A, but when A is true 7A 
is false and when A is false 7A is true. If A E 8, then 7A E $. 
(19) Hence f (A /a )  -b f (7A/a )  = 1 for all a C •. Due to (6), 
this equation defines 7A up to equivalence. 
(20) From (9) and (19), f (AB/a )  + f (7AB/a)  = f (B /a )  for all 
aE  0 and all A, B E 8. 
(21) By putting B = A in (20), we get from (11) 7AA = 2J. 
Similarly, A7A = $2~. Hence also A ~ 7A. 
(22) From the Definition (18) follows the law of double negation 
77A = A. 
(23) If A --+ 7A, then A = ~.  (Law of Self-Contradiction). 
[Proof. A --~ 7A implies A = A7A = 7AA which according to (21) 
means that A = J2f.] 
(24) From the Definition (18) follows: If A ~ B, then A ~ 7B, 
7A --~ B, 7A ~-~ 7B. 
(25) From (20) and (24) follows: If A ~ B, then f (BA/a )  + 
f (B7A/a)  = f (B /a )  for all a C 0. 
(26) The relation A --> B is equivalent to A7B = 7BA = ~.  
Proof. I f  A ---) B, AB  = BA = A.  But from (20) f (A /a )  = f (7BA/a)  + 
[ f (BA/a)  for all a. Hence f (7BA/a)  = 0 for all a, i.e., 7BA = ~.  Since 
A -~B implies A N B, we have also A -~ 7B due to (24). Hence 
f (A7B/a)  = O, i.e., A7B = ~ too. Conversely, 7BA = A7B = 
implies A --~ 7B, hence by (24) also A ~-~ B. We have then not only 
f (A /a )  = f (BA/a)  + f (7BA/a)  = f (BA/a)  for all a due to (20) but 
also f (A /a )  = f (AB/a)  + f (A7B/a)  = f (AB/a)  for all a. Hence 
A = AB = BA.] 
(27) If A [7 7B = ~ and A ~ B, then A --* B. If A --~ B then 
AN7B=~.  
(28) If A --* B, then 7B --~ 7A (Law of Contraposition). 
[Proof. A ---> B, means A7 B = 7BA = ~2~. Put C = 7A and D = 7B 
and we get 7CD = D7C = ~ due to the law of double negation. By 
(26), this means D --~ C.] 
(29) The disjunction C = A U B is defined by (16) in which the 
direction of arrows is reversed. C = A U B can be shown to be equiva- 
lent to C = 7( . . .  7A7B7A7B) .  
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(30) We can prove the idempotent law, commutative law, asso- 
ciative law, absorptive law, de Morgan's law for the predicates belonging 
to$. 
[Proof. The key is the definition of implication and the existence of the 
conjunction (17). Note that if the conjunction exists, it is unique due to 
(16) up to equivalence. (See Ref. [1] for the details).] 
(31) The set $ of simple predicates is a complemented lattice 
(which is not necessarily distributive). 
(32) If all members of $ are mutually compatible, then $ is dis- 
tributive. 
[Proof. By the use of (17), (19), (20), and (29) we can bring both 
f[A U (B N C)/a] andf[(A U B) n (A U C)/a] to 1 - f(']ATBC/a) - 
f( ']ABTC/a) -- f(TA']BTC/a) for all a. Under the same assumption, 
f[A N ( B U C) /a] equals f[( A N B) U ( A N C) /a] for all a.] 
(33) If all members of $ are mutually cmnpatible, then the charac- 
teristic functionf(A/a) as a function of A with a given a is a probability 
measure defined on 6. 
[Proof. By the use of (17), (19), (20), and (29), we can easily show 
that the axiom of probability is satisfied: f (A N B/a) ~ f (A U B/a) = 
f (A/a)  + f(B/a) .  In addition, we have (7).] 
(34) When not all members of $ are mutually compatible, we do 
not have the situation described in (33). In spite of this, we require that 
there exist at least one particular object g E O such that S(A/g) is a 
probability measure, i.e., f (A fl B/g) + f (A U B/g) = f(A/g) + 
f(B/g) for all A, B C 8 whether or not A ~-~ B. 
(35) It is further required of f and g that if A, B E 6, A -~ B and 
A ~ B, thenf(A/g) < f(B/g).  [For realizability of (34) and (35), see 
the next section.] 
(36) (DEDEKIND'S THEOREM) [6]. I f  a lattice is such that each 
element belonging to it can be assigned a weight function which satisfies 
the two relations mentioned in (34) and (35), then it is a modular lattice, 
i.e., if A, B, and C are its members and A ---> C, then A U ( B fl C) = 
(.4 U V) N C. 
(37) $ is a modular lattice. The justification that can be given at 
this stage for the assumptions (34) and (35) is that they seem to repre- 
sent the smallest possible generalization beyond the usual compatible 
case, (33), upholding the concept of probability as much as possible. 
The predicates belonging to $ obey the "modular logic." 
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3. MODIFIED CONCEPTS OF PROBABILITY AND TRUTH-SET 
In this section we shall first see under what conditions the continu- 
ously-valued characteristic function can be interpreted in terms of a 
mixture of different object-types each of which having a binary-valued 
characteristic function. We shall show second that when this interpreta- 
tion is not possible we have to assume that the act of observation alters 
the state of the object and a deviation from the usual logic is inevitable. 
(38) If  the members of $ are finite and all mutually compatible 
(i.e., if $ is a finite distributive lattice), there exists among the members 
a finite number of "atoms," ~1, -2,  " "  , as ,  such that ~ O ~3 = 
~( i  ~ j ) ,a ,  U ~2 U- - .  U ~ = [ : ] ,andthat~-~A-~impl ies  
either ~ = A or A = a~. Any member of $ can be expressed as a disjunc- 
tion of some atoms, a~. That  is, A = O~ °m° ai ,  where i runs over those 
atoms which imply A, a~ -~ A. [What is stated here is a well-known 
theorem about a finite distributive lattice.] 
(39) The probabilities assigned [according to (33)] to all members 
of a finite distributive lattice can be derived from the probability of 
each atom. If  A = U~ °me a~, thenf (A /a )  = ~,~°mef(ada), where the 
index i runs over the same range in the two expressions, i.e., over the 
subset of atoms such that ~ -~ A. [This follows from the probability 
axiom and the definition of atoms.] 
(40) Consider a special object at such that f(a~/a~) = 1 and 
f(~Ha~) = O, for i ~ j. This means that for any A we have f (A/a~) = 1, 
if ~ --~ A and f (A /~)  = 0 if not a~ -~ A. Suppose we now mix these 
obieet-types a~, i = 1, 2, • . - ,  n, in the ratio of pl:p2: • • • :p~, where 
p~ >_- 0 and ~%1 p~ = 1. Then the probability of obtaining an affirma- 
tive result in the observation of a~ will be precisely p~ and the probability 
of obtaining an affirmative result in the observation of A is ~--~°~e p~ 
where the index i runs over those atoms ~ such that a~ -~ A. The truth- 
set of a~ is as, and the truth-set of A is a mixture of at such that ~ -*  A. 
(41) Combining (39) and (40), we conclude that in the case of a 
finite lattice consisting of mutually compatible predicates, we can inter- 
pret the nonbinary characteristic function of an obieet a as the result 
of a mixture of atomic object-types ai in the ratio of f (~da) ,  whereby 
each object a~ [defined in (40)] is in a pure state, i.e., it has a binary 
characteristic function for any member of the lattice. 
(42) Consider the effect of a compound observation AB (8) on a 
mixture defined in (41) in the ease of a distributive lattice. The state 
right after the observation (with an affirmative result) of B, the state 
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of a passes to a' = Ba according to (8). If the interpretation (41) is 
correct, among the atomic object-types a~ existing in a only those ai 
such that a~ -* B will be surviving after the affirmative observation of B. 
In the same way, after AB (with al~irmative results for A and B), only 
those atomic object-types a~ will be surviving such that a~ --+ A and 
a~ --~ B. This characterization f the state after AB is symmetrical with 
respect o A and B, hence it must be also true for the state after BA. 
This is in agreement with the relation AB = BA which is true in a 
distributive lattice. In a word, observation in a distributive lattice has 
the effect of simple filtering, eliminating some existing components and 
retaining some others without changing them. 
(43) In a non-distributive lattice, in general AB ~ BA. This 
means that the interpretation i terms of mixture and filtering does not 
work, implying that the idea of truth-set is untenable. This is in agree- 
ment with the fact that the distributive law breaks down in this case. 
(44) The untenability of the idea of mixture implies also the unten- 
ability of the idea of filtering. As the effect of an affirmative observation 
of A the state changes from a to a' = Aa as before, but in the non- 
distributive case this cannot be interpreted as an elimination and reten- 
tion of some existing components. This point may become more convinc- 
ing if we consider the value of f (AB/a) when it is known that f (A/a)  = 
0. In the commutative case, f (AB/a) = f(BA/a) = f (B/Aa)f (A/a)  = 
0. But, in the non-commutative case, there is no reason why f (AB/a) 
should become zero on the ground that f (A/a) = 0. The relation 
f (AB/a)  ~ 0 implies f (A/Ba) ~ 0 because f (AB/a)  = f (A /Ba) .  
f (B/a) .  In this case we have both f (A/a) = 0 and f (A/Ba) ~ O. The 
state which negates A entirely is changed, as a result of the observation 
of B, to a state which does not negate A. This fact does not agree with 
our notion of elimination, retention or filtering but has to be interpreted 
as a change of the essential feature of the state. See (62) for more about 
this point. 
(45) Within a modular lattice, there exist distributive sublattices. 
Hence by limiting our language to predicates of a single distributive 
sublattice, we can use the usual logic and the usual notion of probability. 
If we use f (A/a) for the entire modular lattice, this function has to be 
considered as a generalization of the usual notion of probability. In the 
distributive case, f (A/a) = 1 means that a belongs to the truth-set of 
A, f(A/a) = 0 means that a belongs to the truth-set of "IA, and 0 
f (A/a)  ~ 1 mean that the specification of a is so loose that a has to be 
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interpreted as a mixture of a member of the truth-set of A and a member 
of truth-set of "]A. In the non-distributive ease, 0 # f (A/a)  # 1 cannot 
be reduced to a mixture of two casesf(A/a) = 0 andf(A/a) = 1. In the 
last ease, the concept of truth-set cannot be used and the logic has to be 
non-distributive. 
4. GEOMETRICAL MODEL 
The task of this section is to give a mathematical expression to the 
characteristic function f (A/a)  to substantiate hat all that we have 
stated about predicates, objects and probability in the foregoing sections 
is free from internal contradiction. 
(46) The clue is that the subspaces of any vector space constitute 
a modular lattice. We assume a real space for simplicity but we can easily 
generalize the formalism to a complex space. Hence, each member of $ 
will be represented by a subspaee, the isomorphism being established by 
interpreting the conjunction as the largest common subspace contained 
by two subspaces and the disjunction as the smallest subspace which 
contain both subspaees. The convenient mathematical expression of a 
subspace is the projection operator corresponding to it. Hence, the 
mathematical expression of each member of $ will be a projection 
operator. 
(47) Let ~I~(A) be the subspace corresponding to predicate A E $, 
and (P[~(A)] denote the projection operator corresponding to ~(A) .  
If ~ ,  i = 1, 2, . . .  , r are r orthogonal, normalized vectors which subtend 
the subspaee ~(A) ,  then (P[~r~(A)] can be expressed by 
~[~(A)]  = ~-~=, ~,~,~ 
The dimension of 9]Z(A) which is r can be computed by trace (P[gE(A)]. 
We abbreviate sometimes (P[9]Z(A)] as (P[A] and trace (P[~I~(A)] as 
D[A]. Corresponding to [] and ~ which are members or $, we shall have 
(el[]] = ] ,  (P[~] = 0 and D[[]] = n and D[~] = 0, where n is the 
number of dimensions of the entire vector space. 
(48) Implication A --+ B is translated as meaning that if x E ~(A) ,  
then x E 9E(B), where x is a vector. The conjunction is interpreted as 
meaning 9E(A ['1 B) = {x lx  E 9~(A) and 9]Z(B)}. The disjunction is 
interpreted as meaning 9]Z(A O B) = {x lx  = ay + bz, y E 9I~(A), 
z E ~(B) ,  a, b:real numbers}. The negation is interpreted as meaning 
~l~(-1A) = /x I x I y for all y E 9E(A)}, where _L means "perpendicu- 
lar to." The compatibility A ~-~ B means that there exists a set of eom- 
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plete orthogonal coordinates, el, e~, . . .  e,, such that ~:)~(A) as well as 
~(B)  is a subspace subtended by some of the e's. 
(49) An object (in a particular state) is essentially characterized 
by the probabilities with which the test results will turn out. Hence, it is 
not surprising that it can be expressed also by some quantities definable 
in reference to the vector space we have introduced above. We cannot 
describe all the heuristic considerations which lead to the following 
results, but it is easy to see that if we introduce the mathematical ex- 
pression of an object (in a particular state) in the following way, we can 
satisfy the required properties of the characteristic function. Let {el, 
e2, . . .  , e~} be a set of complete, orthogonal unit vectors constituting a 
coordinate system, and let w~, i = 2, . . .  , n be a weight (probability) 
distribution, so that wi > 0 and ~%~ w~ = 1. Then the state of an 
object a is expressed by 
Z(a) = ~=1 w4P[e,] 
The state of an object is determined by the coordinate system {e~} and 
the probability distribution {w~}. Z is thus a nonnegative, symmetric 
matrix with trace one. 
(50) The state of an object which consists of one term in the above 
formula is called a pure state and characterized by the fact 
[Z(a)] ~ = Z(a) 
(51) The characteristic function f (A/a)  can now be defined as 
f (A/a)  = trace (@[A].Z[a]) 
(52) We can prove all the properties of f (A/a)  mentioned in the 
foregoing by the formula given by (51). 
(53) I t  can be shown that, for a given a, the characteristic function 
thus defined f (A /a)  behaves like a probability, i.e., f (A  N B/a) + 
f (A  U B/a) = f (A/a)  -Jr-f(B/a), and f(E3/a) = 1 - f(.(~/a) = 1, 
insofar as we limit the predicates to a family of predicates which are 
mutually compatible. 
(54) Whether or not the predicates considered are mutually com- 
patible, there exists a special object g for which f (A/g)  behaves like a 
probability for all A E $. See (34) above. This special object g is de- 
scribed by 
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(55) In the compatible case considered under (33) and (45), all A 
can be expressed in the form: 5)[A] = ~-~.~ome ~r ,  where ~ belongs to 
one and the same coordinate system {~}. 
(56) If the predicates under consideration are all mutually com- 
patible, so that the lattice 8 is distributive, the most precise description 
by a combination of available predicates corresponds to the atoms a~ of 
the distributive lattice 8. See (38). Such an atomic predicate can be 
expressed by a single term in the summation appearing in (47). 6)[a~] = 
~i~ . 
(57) In the distributive case the atomic object a~ corresponding to 
atomic predicate a~ is characterized by f (al /aj)  = ~.  See (40). This 
object a~ is according to (51) expressible by the formula of (49) consist- 
ing of one term, Z(ai) = 6)[a~] = (P[~i]. This is, according to (50), a 
pure state. 
(58) In the distributive case, an object a which has the values of 
characteristic function f (a Ja )  = p~ for the atomic predicates can be 
expressed, according to (49) and (51), as Z(a) = ~_,~'=1 m(P[~]. This 
can be interpreted as a mixture of atomic objects a~ in the mixing ratio, 
pl :p~: '" :pn,  each. atomic obieet al satisfying f(A/a~) = 0 or 1 for all 
AES .  
(59) This shows that in the distributive case, everything can be 
expressed by a single coordinate system {~i}. This is not the case in the 
general non-distributive case. 
(60) When the lattice $ is distributive and an object is described 
by the m, there is an alternative expression for Z, which is--insofar as 
observation is limited to S--equivalent to the one given in (58). This 
second alternative is Z(a) = (~[e], where the vector e is defined by trace 
((~[e]. 6)[~]) = m. If we allow ourselves to use observation ofpredicates 
outside the $, these two expressions of Z(a) behave differently. The 
Z(a)  of this section is a pure state, while Z(a) of (58) is not, in general. 
(61) The state a of an object becomes after the affirmative test of 
A, a' = Aa as defined in (9). All that has been stated about a' can be 
satisfied if we give the following mathematical expression to a':Z (a') = 
(f'[A]Z[a]6)[A]/trace {~[A].Z(a)}. This formula is valid also in the non- 
distributive case when (P[A] and Z(a) have to be expressed in terms of 
different coordinate systems. 
(62) In the distributive case, if we use Z(a) of (58), the difference 
between Z(a) and 6)[A]Z(a)(I'[A] is only that some of the terms in the 
former is missing (filtered out) in the latter. In the non-distributive 
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case Z(a) and Z(a') have to use different coordinate systems if we ex- 
press them in the form given in (49). This shows that Z(a') is not just 
a portion of Z(a),  but entirely different in nature. Observation changes 
the object. 
5. MODIFIED CONCEPT OF INFORMATION 
In this section, we mention some of the elementary features of the 
generalized non-distributive information theory. 
(63) The simplest information quantity S that can be defined in 
the non-distributive case is 
S = - t race [Z(a) log Z(a)] 
This is equal to 
S = -- ~ I  wi log w~ 
where w~ is given in (49), but if we write in this last form, we cannot see 
which coordinates the w's refer to. 
(64) Most of the significant results in information theory can be 
mathematically derived from Gibbs' Theorem. Its generalization to our 
case is 
--trace [Z(a) log Z(a)] ___ - t race [Z(a) log Z(b)] 
where equality holds if and only if 
Z(a) = Z(b) 
This last equation means not only equality of the w's but also equality 
of the coordinate systems in which Z(a) and Z(b) are diagonal. The 
proof of this generalized Gibbs' Theorem requires two lemmas 
(65) LEMMA 1. (GIBBS' THEOREM) I f  p~ > O, ~-~i pl = 1, q~ > O, 
~q~ = 1, fo r i=  1,2 , . . . ,n ,  wehave 
- -  ~-~.~ p~ log q~ > --  ~-~i p~ log p~ 
where the equality holds if and only if p~ = q~ for all i. 
(66) LEMMA 2. (SIMPLE H-THEoREM) Let I] A]~ ]l be a matrix such 
that A j~ >= O, ~ i  Aj~ = 1, and ~-~ A j~ = 1. I f  the probabzlities pi and q~ 
are so related that qj = ~ A j~p~ , we have 
--  ~ i  q; log q~ > --  ~--~,i p~ log p~ 
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The equality holds if and only if those p~'s that belong to the same "ter- 
minally connected family" have the same value. 
(67) D~FmlTION. Two indices i and l are said to be terminally 
connected if there exists a sequence of indices (i, . . .  , m, n, --. , l) in 
which each pair of consecutive indices, say, m and n, are such that there 
is at least one index j that satisfies both Aj~ # 0 and A~., # 0. A family 
of terminally connected indices is such that any two members of the 
family are terminally connected and a member and a non-member of 
the family are not terminally connected. 
(68) Proof of (64). Let three states Z(a), Z(b), Z(c) be defined as 
Z(a) = ~_,~uiS)[ei] 
Z(b) = ~jv j~[~i ]  
Z(c) = ~ w~[~i] 
where wi = ~'~A~iui,  A~i = (ei.~i) 2 = (T~.i) 2. The expression Tj~ = 
(e~'~i) means the scalar product of two vectors e~. and ~.. The fact that 
both coordinate-systems {e~} and {~j} are orthogonal coordinate-systoms 
entails T ~ = T -~, which in turn entails the "double stochasticity": 
~ .  A~i = )-~ A~ = 1. From Lemma 1 follows (using the coordinate 
system of I ~i} )
--trace [Z(a) log Z(b)] > S[Z(c)]. 
From Lemma 2 further follows 
S[Z(c)] > S[Z(a)] 
Combining these two results, we obtain the first part of (64). A careful 
study of the condition that equality should hold in both of these results 
leads to the conclusion that this happens if and only if Z(a) = Z(b) = 
Z(c).  See Ref. [1] for details. 
(69) In the distributive case (i.e., in the usual information theory), 
the interdependence analysis in terms of entropy functions is based on 
two basic theorems. Suppose the object to be described consists of two 
parts of which part 1 can be described by index i ( i  = 1, 2, . . .  , m) and 
part 2 can be described by index j ( j  = 1, 2, . . .  , n) so that the total 
system can be described by a double index i, j. The probability pi of i 
and the probability p~ of j can be derived from the probability pi~ of 
i, j, according to p~ = ~3 Po" and p~. = ~-~.~ P~i. Then we have two 
CONCEPTS OF LOGIC, PROBABILITY, AND INFOI~IVL~TION 15 
theorems 
(I) 
and 
(i, 1 
Then by the use of 
theorem. 
S(1) -{- S(2) _-> S(1, 2) 
(72) S(Z') = S(Z1) -F S(Z2) > S(Z), 
The equality holding if and only if Z = Z p. This is the generalization of
Theorem I above. 
(73) If Z~ is diagonal in the/-coordinate system for part 1 and if 
(II) S(1, 2) >= S(1), S(1, 2) ~ S(2), 
where S(1, 2), S(1) and S(2) are the entropies defined respectively by 
pi~, p~ and p~. Theorem I allows us to introduce anon-negative quantity 
J(1, 2) = S(1) -F S(2) - S(1, 2) > 0 
as ~ measure of the interdependence b tween part 1 and part 2. The 
equality holds if and only if part 1 and part 2 are probabilistically inde- 
pendent. Theorem II further allowed us to conclude J(1, 2) _<_ S(1) 
and J(1, 2) __< S(2) where the equality holds respectively when part 1 
depends entirely on part 2 and when part 2 depends entirely on part 1. 
In the non-distributive case, we have an equivalent of Theorem I but 
not of Theorem II. 
(70) First, a remark about the notation. The matrix elements of 
Z(a) of (68) can be written in the coordinate-system {e~} as [Z(a)]~i, = 
u,~i~, • This we write ( i lZ (a)  I i') = u~i , .  The same matrix Z(a) 
expressed in the coordinate system I~} will have the elements: 
(Jl Z(a) l J') = ~-~ T~iu~Ti-J 1. We consider the case where the index 
of the total system can be expressed by n double index i, l, where i
refers to part I and 1 refers to part 2. The quantity in question will then 
be expressed as ( i, l lZ l i', l' ) . 
(71) Define 
( i lZ l l i ' )  = z l z l i ' ,O  
(zIz21 ') = l l z i i ,  z') 
IZ ' l i ' , / ' )  = (¢lZ l ')(ZlZ2lZ') 
the generalized Gibbs' Theorem, we get the next 
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there exists a/-coordinate system for part 2 such that the total Z becomes 
diagonal in the /-/-coordinate system, then S(Z) - S(Z1) is non- 
negative, corresponding to Theorem II. (See Ref. [1] for proof). But 
this is rather an unusual exception, and in general there is no theorem 
equivalent to Theorem II in the non-distributive case. 
(74) This shows that part of the usual information theory can be 
recovered in the non-distributive, modular case but the information 
theory as a whole needs a reformulation. This reformulation is of course 
such that the usual theory can be rediscovered asa special case. 
6. PATTERN RECOGNITION AND NON-DISTRIBUTIVE LOGIC 
What follows is not the product of an intentional effort on the part of 
the author to force some domain of experience into the framework of a 
non-distributive logic, but it has been so to speak forced upon him dur- 
ing his experimentation n the domain of pattern recognition. He had to 
resort o a non-distributive logic in interpreting some results in pattern 
recognition. What distinguishes this ease from the eases discussed in the 
foregoing sections i  that we do not need to assume that the operation of 
observation has in general an effect of not only filtering but altering the 
state of the object. This situation might encourage those "realistic" 
interpreters of quantum mechanics who do not want to recognize the 
contraction of wave-packet by observation as a real effect. But, such an 
analogy between pattern recbgnition and quantum mechanics i  im- 
possible because in pattern recognition the "probability" f (A/a)  itself 
is directly measurable while in quantum mechanics each observation 
gives only a yes-or-no answer. 
In pattern recognition, each object is usually expressed by an n- 
dimensional vector {xl, x2, --. , xn} which for simplicity we assume to 
be normalized ~ x~  = 1. The suffix i here is not the label of a vector 
but the index of a component. In the standard type of problems, we are 
first given a certain number (p~) of samples (paradigms) of each class 
A, i.e., objects atisfying predicate A-ness. There could be two or more 
classes, (A, B, C , . . . ) .  After the training period during which the 
paradigm vectors are shown, we are given in the application period a 
new vector whose class-belonging is not known, and we are required 
to place this newcomer into one of the classes which have been illus- 
trated by the paradigms. The usual pattern recognition techniques 
assume that we can assign a zone (an n-dimensional volume) to each 
class in accordance with paradigms, o that the newcomer can be at- 
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tributed to the class in whose zone its vector falls. In other words, pat- 
tern recognition can be considered as a search for the extension of a 
predicate, when the name of the predicate (such as A-ness, B-heSS, 
etc.) and some members of the extension are given as samples. 
In many experimental cases, the present author was led to discover 
that this zone picture of a class is a very poor one and that the paradigm 
vectors in reality lie mostly in a subspace (usually passing the origin) of 
dimensions m which is considerably smaller than the total dimension as 
well as the number of paradigms: m << n, m << vA. In other words, if 
[xi~}, ~ = 1, 2, - . .  , v~ are paradigm vectors of class A, there exists a 
subspace whose projection operator is (~[A] such that 
VA 
2 
a=l  
- -  O" 
YA 
where ~ can be made very close to unity (say, 0.95), with a very small 
number of dimensions: m = trace ((P[A]) << n and m << ,~. The ~ is the 
fraction of the total vector components that lie in the subspace, hence 
may be considered as a measure of the fidelity of this subspace picture 
of a class. When a newcomer {y~} without class-label arrives, we should 
compare ((P[A]y) 2 for different A's and assign the newcomer to the class 
which maximizes this quantity (which is the square of the cosine be- 
tween the vector y and the subspace A). This subspace approach (called 
CLAFIC method) has been tested again and again and has proved to be 
quite successful [9, 10]. 
Suppose we interpret he situation we envisage here as follows: A 
class of objects corresponds to a subspace in an n-dimensional represen- 
tation space and any deviation therefrom is due to some kind of noise 
which inevitably occurs during processing. Then it is inevitable to con- 
clude that A --* B (A-hess implies B-hess) means that the subspace of 
A is a sub-subspace of the subspace of B, i.e., (P[A]g~[B] = 5)[BIg)[A] = 
(~[A]. Assigning ~ and [] to the subspace of dimension zero and the 
entire representation space, this definition of implication is sufficient o 
conclude that the set of classes A, B, C, • • • constitute a modular lattice. 
This lattice is non-distributive insofar as there are subspaces involved 
which do not belong to a single family of orthogonal subspaces (sub- 
spaces panned by some axes of one and the same orthogonal coordinate 
system). The negation of A can be represented by the largest subspace 
that is perpendicular to the subspace of A. 
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This is enough to let us conclude that the logic governing the predi- 
cates, A-ness, B-ness, . . .  , etc., is in general a modular logic which is 
not necessarily distributive. Since there is no restriction on the kind of 
predicates we can deal with, except hat the objects satisfying these 
predicates can be submitted to measurements (or binary tests) of some 
sort, this conclusion has a very large domain of validity. 
We can identify (5)[A]y) ~ as f(A/y), i.e., 
((~[A]y) 2 = f(A/y) 
and interpret it as the probability of object y belonging to class A. This 
is mathematically identical with the formula given in (51), when the 
object a is in a pure state. This interpretation off(A/y) as a probability 
is perfectly acceptable with the same limitations that were explained in 
Section 3. The only difference is that in the present case the measure- 
ment of y gives directly the value of f(A/y) provided the subspace of A 
is already known. The mathematical quantities of the type f(AB/y) 
when A --~ B is not the case have no clear interpretation here although 
f(A n B/y) has. 
The conclusion reached in this section is quite startling, because it 
would extend the domain that necessitates a non-distributive logic to 
the domain of ordinary propositions (such as this letter is A, that sound 
is "all") of ordinary life. But we have to recognize that the whole argu- 
ment in this section is based on two simplifying assumptions. First, if 
we make exactly a = 1, the number of dimensions of each subspace be- 
comes close to n, if not exactly n. Second, the vectors belonging to a class 
are found in a good approximation i a subspace, but it is not entirely 
certain that any arbitrary vector in this subspace conversely corresponds 
in reality to the class. In fact, it is confirmed that certain directions 
within a subspaee are heavily represented by actual objects and some are 
not. According to our subspace picture, if we make the disjunction of 
A and B, the subspace corresponding to A (J B becomes the smallest 
subspace which includes both the subspace of A and the subspace of B. 
Hence, the subspace of A (J B contains vectors which belong neither to 
the subspace of A and the subspaee of B. This is formally admissible 
due to the probability interpretation of the characteristic function but it 
is questionable whether all the vectors of the subspace of A [J B are 
inhabited by actual objects. In spite of these limitations, the subspace 
picture of concepts is perfectly tenable as a good approximation to 
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actuality, and a deviation from the distributive logic even on the level 
of ordinary language may not be dismissed as impossibility. 5 
7. BACKGROUND AND RELATED PROBLEMS 
When Birkoff and yon Neumann published in 1936 their paper [7] on 
what  they called quantum logic, they depended strongly on the theo- 
retical structure of quantum mechanics, that had been formulated 
(partly by yon Neumann himself) in terms of the IIilbert space. It was 
K. Hus imi  [11] who tried as early as in 1937 to found the non-distribu- 
tive modular  logic directly on the experimental basis of atomic phe- 
nomena without relying on the I-Iilbert space used in quantum mechanics. 
The  present paper can be said to be in the stream of thought started by 
Hus imL It was the present author's belief from the beginning that the 
modular  logic would have a wide application outside atomic physics. 
It was in that spirit that he wrote in 1948 his article on the non-Boolean 
logic in a Japanese handbook  of philosophy [12]. 
In 1956 he gave at the IBM Research Laboratory a series of lectures on 
quantum logic along this line, which was repeated at Yale Graduate 
School of Physics in 1959. The  lecture notes were soon thereafter circu- 
lated quite widely, but they appeared in a printed form only in 1966 [3]. 
In these lectures, he introduced already the function f(A/a) which is 
discussed more succinctly in the present paper. The  central idea was that 
in order to reconstruct a logic free from the concept of truth-set we  should 
rely on Peirce's principle ("there is one primary and fundamental logical 
relation, that is illation [implication]" [13]) and derive implication from 
a function of the type, f(A/a). In the meantime, in 1959 and 1960, the 
author suggested that the modular logic may be useful in resolving some 
of the riddles of mind-body problem [4, 14]. In a paper presented at a 
conference on the philosophical problems in psychology in 1968, he men- 
tioned six reasons for which a continuously-valued characteristic function 
of the type f(A/a) should be taken as the starting point of a general 
discussion of logical problems. I t  may be of some interest o the readers 
of the present paper to repeat briefly three of them here. (1) According 
to the present day theory of probability, we have, as mentioned already 
5 In fact, most of the subspaees we obtained in experiments in pattern recog- 
nition belong approximately to a family of or~hogonal subspaces, allowing appli- 
cation of the usual logic but some of them definitively do not, suggesting the 
existence of limitations to the usual ogic. 
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in Section 1, to have first a Boolean lattice of propositions (or a sigma 
algebra) and then define probability (or measure) on it. But, it seems 
more natural and truthful to our human experience to derive logic from 
a probability-like function such as f (A /a ) .  Probability precedes logic. 
(2) About 20 years ago, an erroneous view was widespread that the 
neurons process information on a binary basis as in Boolean logic. But, 
now it is clear that information in the nervous ystem is encoded and 
processed in terms of continuous variables (such as the interval between 
two pulses). (3) In reductionistic efforts, it is usually assumed that the 
state on a higher level can be determined by the state on a lower level. 
Thus the psychological state is determined by the neurophysiological 
state, the biological state is determined by the physical state, etc. But, 
this is not true even in the simplest reductionist effort of explaining 
thermodynamics by atomic physics. Strictly speaking, the temperature 
T of a system is not completely determined by the energy of the micro- 
scopic state a. This means that f (T /a )  is not binary. 
As we have shown in this paper, starting from a probability-like con- 
tinuously-valued characteristic function, we can reconstruct a logic, 
but this logic is in general non-distributive, and perhaps modular in many 
cases, and it becomes distributive only in a rather exceptional case where 
compatibility of all predicates i guaranteed. 
The brand of information theory the present author introduced 30 
years ago [15] (i.e., 10 years before the ordinary information theory) 
was the general theory sketched above in Section 5, of which the usual 
information theory is a special case. 
After conclusion of the present work, an interesting paper by P. A. 
Heelan [16] came to the present author's attention, in which he raises a 
legitimate objection against he usual version of "quantum logic." The 
notion of improper predicate and the notion of object as used in the 
present paper seem to be the right way to circumvent his objection. 
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